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IS THERE A NEED TO AMEND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT?
REMARKS OF JOHNJ. SWEENEY*
In 1979, when President Carter was still in office, an organizing
drive began among the employees of a restaurant in the midwest. I
have no idea why this drive began, but I suspect it was for the same
reason that most organizing begins-workers believe that life is better
with a union contract. Regardless of the reason, however, the drive
began and approximately sixty percent of the employees authorized
the union to petition for an election. The union filed a petition with
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), and after the
now-normal delays, an election was held. The employer was adamantly opposed to the organizing campaign and did everything he
could to discourage his employees from voting for a union. The union
lost the election.
In reviewing the organizing campaign, the Board found the activities of the employer so outrageous that it issued a bargaining order,
something that is seldom done these days, instructing the employer to
deal with the union.1 The employer appealed, and last month, nearly
four years after the organizing efforts began, the court held that the
employer was not required to bargain with the union. 2 In reaching its
conclusion, the court cited the large turnover in the workforce that
3
had occurred since the original organizing drive in 1979.
I do not think that it is legitimate to base an argument on selected
horror stories such as this one. Nor do I contend that this result would
have been avoided if we had passed the National Labor Relations
Reform Act six years ago. But I do believe that a modern industrial
nation cannot survive in the years ahead without a system of labor
relations that can depend on an impartial and effective legal mechanism available to both labor and management.
The recent NLRB decision in Milwaukee Spring4 is simply the last
nail in a coffin that has been prepared for the National Labor Relations Act for many years. The appointment of right-to-work attorneys
to the General Counsel's office was the announcement of the pallbearers. If you speak to the front line leadership of my union, or of any

* President, Service Employees International Union.
1. Village IX, Inc., 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
15,288, at 25,947 (1982),
enforcement denied, 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983).
2. NLRB v. Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360, 1373 (7th Cir. 1983).
3. Id. at 1372.
4. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op.
(Jan. 23, 1984), rev'g 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,317 (1982).
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union, you hear the same refrain: The NLRB is useless; we must find
other ways to do business.
So my answer to the question whether the National Labor Relations
Act should be amended is simple: NO! The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or Act) 5 is, for all practical purposes, now dead and
should be either buried or resurrected. The NLRA has already been
effectively amended, not by legislative or even judicial edict, but by
power politics and management strategies that have destroyed the
balance of power that had existed between labor and management for
nearly fifty years.
We should pause to remember what it was like prior to the passage
of the NLRA: when long and sometimes violent strikes were the rule,
rather than the exception; when there were massive boycotts, and
city-wide shutdowns and picketing. The NLRA changed all that because it provided a legitimate forum for the orderly settlement of
labor/management difficulties. And it has served us fairly well.
The labor movement did try to amend the NLRA in 1977. Delays in
handling unfair labor practice charges and in adjudicating representation matters were eroding the effect of the Act and the effectiveness of
the Board. The attempt failed. Since that time, delays caused by
overwork, increasing case load and management militance have doubled the median time necessary to obtain a Board decision. There is
presently a gridlock at the NLRB, and employers have discovered the
advantages of this gridlock. With the aid of union busting consultants,
these employers have found more and more ways to achieve delays.
The recent politicization of the Board by the Reagan Adminstration
confirms judgments made three and four years ago that corporate
America intended to dismantle the National Labor Relations Act.
President Reagan has been their instrument. The President once said
he came to Washington to "drain the swamp." He and his colleagues
quickly realized that the way to drain the swamp at the NLRB was to
flood it by encouraging employers to disregard the law, and simply
ride-out any charges filed.
What is to become of all of this? If President Reagan is re-elected,
perhaps he will see that a healthy economy must have cooperative
labor/management relations, and will moderate his policies so that
some of these excesses are reversed. Or perhaps the right-wing will
convince him to repeal the Act so our legal system more accurately
reflects reality. Or perhaps there will be a Democratic administration
more sympathetic to the rights of workers and to the principles of
collective bargaining.

5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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Meanwhile, as we wait to see what political solutions are forthcoming, we in organized labor are returning to our roots, and to the
tactics that helped us wring simple economic justice from the hands of
the rich and powerful in this country not so many years ago. There are
other ways to organize workers than to use the National Labor Relations Act. We do not need union representation elections sanctioned
by the NLRB. We have the ability and the tactics to force employers
to recognize our unions-tactics such as massive boycotts, coordinated
strikes and city-wide shutdowns. We can conduct corporate pressure
campaigns that cause economic damage to corporations that are not
willing to deal with us fully and fairly. The Service Employees International Union has already had success with such campaigns against
Beverly Enterprises, the largest chain of nursing homes in the country,
and the Equitable Life Assurance Society, the third largest insurance
company in the world.
These tactics are as expensive as they are effective. Moreover, they
create severe repercussions by discarding the "civilized" labor relations system in favor of fighting in the streets. It is a disastrous price
for the labor movement and for our country to pay to ensure that
workers are represented. But it is a price we will have to pay unless
either public policy or the present Administration is changed.
If one or the other of these does not happen, I am afraid that we
will be sitting here three or four years from now having a lively debate
on who is responsible for the demise of the National Labor Relations
Act.
American workers have always been loyal to our modern capitalistic economy. We have organized and bargained hard, but we were
always willing to make compromises. Workers in general want to
work and want to enjoy their work. They want their employers to
prosper. They want their nation to prosper. American workers are,
above all, pragmatic and non-ideological. When we create a labor/
management system that does not build on these attitudes-that encourages confrontation instead of cooperation-then we have taken a
significant step toward fundamentally reordering our economy and
our democracy. I do not think that is something that will please either
management or labor.

REMARKS OF JAY SIEGEL*
My answer to the question-is there a need to amend the National
Labor Relations Act-can best be expressed by discussing with you
Maslow's hierarchy of needs. You will remember that Maslow constructed a pyramid to symbolize the various degrees of needs that man
experiences. At the lowest level, the needs are food, clothing and
shelter; as one moves up, the needs include less essential things; and at
the top of the pyramid, the level of needs is more esoteric. If you asked
me in 1978 where we were in this hierarchy, as a management lawyer
I would have said that we were at the lowest level-it was a question
of survival. Today, however, as we return to normalcy at the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), I am happy to say we are at
a much higher level. The recent appointees are bringing back some of
the established doctrines that both labor and management had
learned to live with.
A prime example of this return to normalcy is Milwaukee Spring.'
Until the Board's first decision in Milwaukee Spring in 1982, management and union attorneys knew exactly what the rule was and could
structure their actions accordingly. In Milwaukee Spring, the Board
held, for the first time in forty years, that section 8(d)2 prohibits an
employer from moving his plant during the term of a collective bargaining agreement without consent of the union. 3 This interpretation
of section 8(d) by three members of the National Labor Relations
Board drastically changed the law in a way that neither labor nor
management had ever anticipated. The Board's recent reversal of
Milwaukee Spring merely reinstates the traditional interpretation of
the employer's duty to bargain.
The same problem has occurred repeatedly in the last five years.
After the failure of the labor law reform movement, I predicted that
the unions would try to broaden the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act)4 by bringing selected cases before the Board prior to
the new members being appointed to the agency by the Reagan
administration could assume control. That is exactly what happened.
For example, the "no-solicitation" rule, which had always exempted the United Way, went down the drain. 5 Likewise, the welldelineated and time-worn distinction between "working time" and
* Senior Principal, Siegel, O'Connor & Kainen, P.C., Hartford, Connecticut.
Mr. Siegal is also former chairman of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the
American Bar Association.
1. Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op.
(Jan. 23, 1984), rev'g 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,317 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
3. 1982-83 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 15,317 at 26,036.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. Hammary Mfg. Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1346 (1982)
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"working hours" for general solicitation purposes was eliminated.6 We
had Board decisions restricting the well-established Collyer doctrine7
of deferral to arbitration and its concomitance, the Spielberg8 postarbitration review doctrine.

Rules that management and labor had come to understand as
clearly-defined codes of conduct were being turned on their head.
What we have today is a return to normalcy at the Board, a return to

those "liveables" that both sides had learned to accept. What would
happen if the Board were suddenly to take the twenty-four hour rule
in election campaigns and subject it to a case-by-case analysis? We
have all learned to live with the twenty-four hour rule. The unions

know what is expected of them, management knows what is expected
of it, and nobody has any problem with that. We do not need the
Board, regardless of who is in control, to turn these well-understood

guidelines inside out. Such action breeds only instability. It adds an
element of politicization to the Board, and helps neither the Agency
nor the administration of the Act.
To understand the present state of the NLRA, it is necessary to take
a brief look at the history of labor legislation. The National Labor
Relations Act was passed in 19359 as a result of the efforts of both
Senator Wagner and Senator Walsh. Twelve years later, in 1947, it
was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act. 10 In 1959, Congress passed the
Landrum-Griffin Act" based on the outcome of the hearings investigating misconduct within labor unions.
Those of you who are stock market technicians or chartists may note
that there is a rhythmic pattern under which we have the Act
amended approximately every twelve years. Fifteen years later, in
6. T.R.W. Bearings Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 442, 443 (1981) (discarding distinction that made no-solicitation rule presumptively valid if applied to
"working time" and presumptively invalid if applied to "working hours," in favor of
presumption of invalidity in both cases), overruled, Our Way, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B.
No. 61, slip op. (Dec. 20, 1983).
7. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); e.g., General Am. Transp.
Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 809-10 (1977); Kansas Meat Packers Div. of Aristo Foods,
Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. 543, 543 (1972). The Board recently repudiated General American Transportation and resurrected the Collyer doctrine. United Technologies
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83, slip op. (Jan. 19, 1984).
8. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); e.g., Professional Porter &
Window Cleaning Co., Div. of Propoco, Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 137-38 (1982);
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1015 (1980); Suburban Motor Freight,
Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146-47 (1980).
9. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
10. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
11. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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1974, we had the health care amendments, 12 and if you follow the
averages, in 1987 we should have the next series of amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act. The problem with the Labor Law
Reform Bill' 3 was that no real need for amendment of the Act had
built up. It was a matter of force-feeding on the part of labor unions
that were frustrated because they were not able to organize successfully.
The union complaint that I hear most frequently today is that the
national labor policy, as expressed in the National Labor Relations
Act, is in a shambles. When a labor union successfully organizes
employees, unions claim the Act is working. But when they are unsuccessful at organizing, they charge the Act is not working. I suggest
that the Act is working just as well when employees vote "no" as when
they vote "yes."
The basic objective of the National Labor Relations Act is not the
unionization of all workers in the United States. Rather, the Act
guarantees to workers the right of self-determination to decide if they
want a union. Not all workers in this country feel honestly that they
would be better off with a labor union or that they need a union to
protect themselves. The key point is that the Act guarantees, not
unionization, but the right to decide if you want to be unionized.
The National Labor Relations Board is supposed to provide a measure of security for the workers of this country. Is there a need to
amend the Act? In my opinion, no: I think the system is working
pretty well.
After the failed labor reform movement, the Board attempted to
amend the NLRA through case decisions, and for some time was
successful. Ironically, now that the Board is retreating from these
decisions, it faces charges of politicization. Professor Derek Bok, now
the President of Harvard University, wrote in 1971:
In a decentralized, adversary system of labor relations, there are no
union and management organizations with the authority or the
will to join together to improve the quality of legislation and the
administration and staffing of legal institutions. Without such cooperation the enactment of labor legislation becomes highly controversial, and the laws that result tend to be viewed, with some
justice, as a body of rules which one side has succeeded in enacting
at the expense of the other.

12. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169, 183 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
13. S. 1883, H.R. 8410, reprinted in Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearingson S.
1883 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 26 (1977).
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The lack of high-level cooperation between American business and
labor has further affected the legal environment by forcing the
government to take major responsibility for resolving the basic
issues of value that divide the parties.
... This process is most clearly illustrated by the history of the
National Labor Relations Board. Throughout its life, the NLRB has
been pilloried on three grounds. It has been consistently accused of
bias, its personnel have been criticized for incompetence, and its
14
procedures have been attacked for moving at a tortoise-like pace.

The problem with the NLRB that John Sweeney talked about today
is not the fault of employers, unions or Congress-it is the fault of the
Board. The agency's own internal procedures encourage delay. They
encourage a decision-making process that is frustrating to both management and labor. A typical example is the "red flag" system. For
many years, if you were a Board member and a decision was being
circulated, you could "ice" the decision simply by putting a red-flag
memo on it. In effect, this memo would hold that decision until the
Board discussed the majority ruling or perhaps until a dissent was
written. At one point, there were hundreds of cases that were iced
because of disagreements among the Board members. I have been told
that there are Board agendas at which there are five positions because
there are five Board members, and that the Board members jockey for
position to try to put together a majority or a coalition on particular
policy decisions.
The internal decision-making process at the National Labor Relations Board is the real reason that we have such delay. The Board has
opposed rule-making over the last thirty years, due principally to the
avid opposition of John Fanning, who is no longer there. The Board's
involvement in de minimis cases has been consistently criticized by the
courts of appeals for wasting the time of members and taxpayers on
points of law that really do not have any major impact. Every factual
dispute in the regional office based on affidavits in an unfair labor
practice case is required to go to hearing under the orders of the
General Counsel. The regional directors are not allowed to resolve
factual disputes based on their investigation. The result is we have
case after case involving determinations of detailed factual issues.
My law firm has won the last five trials we have had before administrative law judges, all on complaints that never should have been
authorized, but nobody seems to pay any attention to streamlining the
Board procedures.
This may be a case of Washington against the rest of the country,
and I am not about to make a plea for the present occupant of the
14. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws, 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1394, 1448-49, 1451 (1971) (citations omitted).
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White House, but certainly it is time that somebody sat down and got
the Board to streamline their procedures. It is to the credit of Chairman Dotson that the Board has enacted the thirty-day rule on dissents. No member may hold up a majority decision from leaving the
agency for more than thirty days. Of course, those who do not like the
Board's new policies criticize the dissent rule. But what goes on at the
agency is bureaucratic in-fighting and bureaucratic policy-making of
the highest order. That is why we have delay at the National Labor
Relations Board. And these problems were ignored during the Labor
Reform hearings in 1977, 1978 and 1979.
There is one area in which amendment of the Act might afford the
Board some relief. The Board has injected itself into the bargaining
process. Its caseload could be lessened by amending the Act to prevent
the parties from using the unfair labor practice procedure as a tactical
device in collective bargaining negotiations. The artificial categories
of mandatory subjects of bargaining, permissive subjects of bargaining, good faith bargaining, and bad faith bargaining overwhelm the
Board with cases involving exhaustive records, subjective interpretations of what was said at the table, and analysis of the bargaining
notes of each side. Adjudicating these cases consumes a great deal of
time. I suggest that we consider amending the National Labor Relations Act to eliminate some of the bargaining requirements of section
8(a)(5). 15 The Board should get the parties to the table, leave them
there, and from certification to ratification, stay out of the bargaining
process. What happens at the table should depend not on the legal
sideshow, but on the economic leverage and the skill of the negotiators
for both sides.
It is interesting that when the Act was first passed in 1935, Senator
Walsh, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor, said that after the employees have chosen their organization
and selected their representatives, all the bill proposed to do was to
escort them to the door of the employer and present them as the legal
representatives of his employees. 16 The Act was not intended to inquire into what happens behind the doors of the negotiating room.
The 1961 report by the Committee for Economic Development
(CED Report) examined this question of the Board's involvement in
the bargaining process. The report found that matters such as the
subjects to be covered by bargaining, the procedures to be followed,
and the nuances of strategy involving the timing of offers are best left
to the parties themselves. Indeed, the workload of the National Labor
Relations Board and of the parties could be substantially reduced by
returning the issues to the employer and union, where Senator Walsh
wisely left them.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
16. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7672-73 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
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The CED Report is as sensible and as far-sighted today as it was
then. As the Committee recognized, the only way to relieve the pressure on the NLRB is to remove it from some of the areas into which it
has intruded. If we can get a sense of balance in the Board, a sense of
streamlining the process, then I think some of the problems that John
Sweeney has complained about would be substantially relieved.
Every Board member has a staff of twenty legal assistants. A Board
member in the 1960's once said that he did not need twenty legal
assistants, and that by having so many he had to provide work for
them. The old adage that work expands to fill time clearly applies
here. This member proposed that Board members could get along
with five or six legal assistants, with smaller staffs, and as a result
cases would move more quickly.
The bottom line is that I am against amending the National Labor
Relations Act, except in the one area I indicated. Instead, I think the
Board must streamline its own procedures. As the old New England
expression says: If it ain't broke, don't fix it.

